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Foreword 
National Human Rights Institutions (NHRI) are 
independent state-mandated institutions tasked 
with the promotion and protection of human 
rights in and by their own countries. Their role and 
functions are governed by the Paris Principles, 
adopted by the United Nations General Assembly 
in 1993. This international standard for NHRIs 
applies to all, irrespective of the political situation 
within the country. This has proven to be the right 
approach, because realising the human rights of 
all people in a state is essential both to sustain-
ing peace within a society and to re-establishing 
peace, including through a successful process of 
transitional justice. In fact, human rights violations 
are often among the core underlying causes of 
conflicts. Violations that are not addressed and 
resolved in a just and inclusive manner continue 
to provoke societal frictions, mistrust and hatred, 
which can result in the re-emergence of violence, 
other widespread human rights violations and 
conflicts. Similarly, impunity for human rights 
violations and injustice under a dictatorial regime 
will prevent the establishment of a new culture of 
accountability and of human rights, thus resulting 
in an ongoing weakness of the rule of law and of 
respect for human rights. 
Hence, the mandate of NHRIs to promote and pro-
tect human rights takes on particular importance 
within the framework of post-conflict environments 
and newly established democracies. How do 
NHRIs address the negative human rights impacts 
of violent conflicts or dictatorial regimes in such 
environments? How can NHRIs contribute through 
their unique mandate to the success of transitional 
justice processes? And finally, what lessons can 
other NHRIs and the international human rights 
community learn from such processes?
The Global Alliance of National Human Rights 
Institutions (GANHRI) has addressed some of 
these issues over the past years, further defining 
the role of NHRIs in conflict and post-conflict 
situations, in early warning, conflict prevention 
and the re-establishment of peaceful societies and 
their contribution to peaceful, just and inclusive 
societies (see GANHRI 2017). Working on how 
to deal with the ongoing consequences of war 
and post-war situations as well as of totalitarian 
dictatorships is part of the mandate of the Ger-
man Institute for Human Rights, Germany’s NHRI. 
The present study builds on the discussions within 
GANHRI and shows how NHRIs have used their 
mandate to respond to the challenges of transi-
tional justice processes. The lessons learned in 
the three countries examined in this study, namely 
Afghanistan, Georgia, and Uganda, provide valu-
able insights for all NHRIs. We are grateful to our 
colleagues in these institutions for having shared 
their experience and views with us.
The mandate of NHRIs is first and foremost a 
human rights mandate, in other words, it encom-
passes all human rights issues, not only those 
associated with violent conflict and transitional 
justice. It is precisely this broad human rights 
mandate that enables NHRIs to consider human 
rights violations in a comprehensive way, allowing 
them to show how human rights issues are inter-
connected, and thus to propose holistic solutions. 
In addition, NHRIs are required to monitor the 
implementation of human rights. Hence they can 
help ensure that the – inevitably lengthy – transi-
tional justice processes remain under observation. 
In all this, they can apply their particular powers 
of inquiry, such as the power to access records, 
summon witnesses, or hold public hearings, and 
to report to domestic and international bodies. We 
hope that the present study will help NHRIs and 
states alike to better leverage the unique mandate 
of NHRIs to ensure the promotion and protec-
tion of all human rights in transitional justice 
processes.
Professor Dr Beate Rudolf
Director of the German Institute for Human Rights
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SUMMARy 9
Summary
How do National Human Rights Institutions 
(NHRIs) address the negative human rights 
impacts of dictatorial regimes and violent conflict, 
and thus successfully contribute to transitional 
justice? This is the focus of this study, which pres-
ents examples from the experiences of the NHRIs 
in Afghanistan, Georgia and Uganda, who kindly 
shared them with the authors. 
The provision of justice for past and present 
violations of human rights is intended to reduce 
the culture of impunity, in the country in question, 
as well as in the respective world region or even 
on an international scale. Addressing the issue of 
transitional justice facilitates peace processes, 
but requires strong state institutions and the 
political will to act. When justice for past and 
present abuses is denied, conflicts linger on, as 
colleagues from Afghanistan pointed out during 
the research for this study. ‘Peace-versus-justice’, 
they reminded us, is a false dichotomy, and one 
that the international community has rightly left 
behind, at least in its rhetoric. 
The study shows how three NHRIs, each perform-
ing their essential functions in its own coun-
try-specific context – promotion and protection of 
human rights – have interacted with transitional 
justice aims and processes and draws lessons 
from what the NHRIs have learned while doing so.
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1 Transitional Justice and National Human 
Rights Institutions: An Overview 
Transitional justice as a discipline and as a con-
cept in academic and practical inquiry is relatively 
recent. A 2004 Report of the UN Secretary-Gen-
eral describes transitional justice as the full range 
of processes and mechanisms that are:
associated with a society’s attempts to come 
to terms with a legacy of large-scale past 
abuses, in order to ensure accountability, serve 
justice and achieve reconciliation. These may 
include both judicial and non-judicial mech-
anisms, with differing levels of international 
involvement (or none at all), and individual 
prosecutions, reparations, truth-seeking, insti-
tutional reform, vetting and dismissals, or a 
combination thereof.1
Since the Secretary-General’s report was pub-
lished, experience with transitional justice has 
grown vast and chequered,2 but the definition 
of transitional justice and what it comprises has 
remained largely unchanged.3 
National Human Rights Institutions (NHRIs) have 
a mandate to protect and promote human rights. 
They are financed by their respective states and 
yet act independently of them. The autonomy to 
set their own priorities is inextricably bound up in 
the raison d’être of the NHRIs, which require this 
freedom in order to promote and protect the full 
range of human rights. NHRIs introduce human 
rights debates into the domestic realm, rendering 
them more tangible for the population and state 
alike as they do so. In addition, their geographical 
proximity enables NHRIs to monitor the national 
implementation of human rights obligations more 
closely than regional and international institutions. 
NHRIs are thus positioned between civil society 
and the state, between the national, regional and 
international level. Conformity with the Paris Prin-
ciples that regulate NHRIs is assessed regularly in 
a peer review acknowledged by the UN.4 
The Paris Principles do not speak to how NHRIs 
should approach contexts of transitional justice 
or post-conflict or post-dictatorial regimes. They 
require that NHRIs be vested with the competence 
to promote and protect human rights, and that 
their mandates should be as broad as possible.5 
Thus the Principles allow for a wide range of 
approaches and forms of coordination between 
NHRIs and mechanisms and processes of transi-
tional justice. The General observations on the 
Paris Principles, which provide interpretation and 
guidance to NHRIs and states concerning their 
obligations under the Principles, address the situa-
tion of NHRIs during a coup d’état or a state of 
emergency. Under such circumstances, an NHRI is 
expected to “conduct itself with a heightened level 
of vigilance and independence, and in strict accor-
dance with its mandate.”6 The General observa-
tions further highlight that while the impact of a 
state of emergency varies from one situation to 
another, all emergency situations invariably have a 
dramatic impact on human rights, and in particu-
lar on vulnerable groups. Disruptions to peace and 
1 UN, Secretary-General (2004), para 8. See also UN, Secretary-General (2010) for an updated guidance note.
2 For a recent overview and bibliography see: Haider (2016); Nesiah (2016); International Journal of Transitional Justice (2015). 
3 See e. g. the mandate of the UN Special Rapporteur on the promotion of truth, justice, reparation and guarantees of non-recurrence. 
http://www.ohchr.org/EN/Issues/TruthJusticeReparation/Pages/Mandate.aspx (accessed 24.09.2016). 
4 For a good introduction: linos / Pegram (2016). 
5 UN, General Assembly (1993), para 1–2.
6 ICC-SCA (2013), p. 50. 
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security therefore do not diminish the obligations 
of the NHRI. These institutions play a key role in 
investigating allegations of violations “promptly, 
thoroughly, and effectively”.7 
In addition to the Global Alliance of National 
Human Rights Institutions (GANHRI), whose Sub-
committee on Accreditation (SCA) issues the Gen-
eral observations, NHRIs can also look to regional 
networks for technical and operational guidance. 
– In its 2009 Rabat Declaration, the Network 
of African National Human Rights Institutions 
(NANHRI) resolved to continue to contribute to 
the mechanisms and processes of transitional 
justice and to support societies in transition 
through a broad range of approaches to and 
forms of engagement with the mechanisms 
of transitional justice.8 NANHRI also commis-
sioned a baseline assessment on East-African 
NHRIs active in conflict management and 
peacebuilding in 2012. The report found capac-
ity weaknesses, lack of human and financial 
resources, frequent deficits in the coordination 
of activities, and a lack of proactive engage-
ment with conflict-related issues on part of the 
NHRIs.9 
– In 2012 and 2013, the Asia Pacific Forum of 
NHRIs discussed strategies for NHRIs to work 
towards supporting genuine and inclusive 
transitions to democracy in Asia.10 The network 
focused on the role of women in political and 
democratic reform, how NHRIs can work with 
police and security forces, and how they can 
engage in the promotion of democracy and 
good governance. 
– The European Network of NHRIs (ENNHRI) 
has started to work on the issue of NHRIs 
in conflict situations and initiated a survey 
among its members in mid-2016 to gauge 
their views with respect to NHRI modes of 
operation, mandates and key activities in such 
situations. The 2015 Kyiv Declaration on the 
Role of National Human Rights Institutions in 
Conflict and Post-Conflict Situations outlines 
tasks and responsibilities of NHRIs, states and 
the international community in times of violent 
conflict.11 
A Guidance Note issued by oHCHR in 2008 
enjoins NHRIs “to support processes that ensure 
accountability and combat impunity, provide 
remedies to victims, promote respect for the rule 
of law, and strengthen democracy and sustain-
able peace”12 and gives numerous examples of 
how NHRIs have already been doing so. NHRIs 
may also help lay the groundwork for a phase of 
transitional justice by monitoring and recording 
violations during periods of conflict and authoritar-
ian rule and the transitional periods that follow. At 
some point in the future these efforts can support 
initiatives involving prosecution, truth-seeking 
and truth-telling mechanisms, reparations and/or 
vetting. NHRIs can assist victims by ensuring that 
they have access to adequate justice mechanisms, 
and helping them go gain access to reparations 
and to information on the remedies available 
through transitional justice mechanisms. NHRIs 
can also play a part in arranging appropriate relo-
cation and resettlement measures for victims and 
survivors.13 
In what follows, the functions that NHRIs most 
commonly perform to address the negative human 
rights impacts of dictatorial regimes and wars 
are analysed with reference to examples from the 
work of selected NHRIs, taken from publicly avail-
able NHRI documentation. 
7 ICC-SCA (2013), p. 49. 
8 Raoul Wallenberg Institute (2009). 
9 NANHRI (2014), p. 32 ff. 
10 Asia Pacific Forum (2013); Asia Pacific Forum (2012). 
11 See for an overview ENNHRI (2016) and ENNHRI (2015). 
12 oHCHR (2008), para 1. 
13 UNDP / oHCHR (2010), p. 48. 
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2 How NHRIs Engage 
NHRIs operating in fragile situations, such as 
post-conflict situations, face greater challenges in 
their efforts to promote and protect human rights 
as it is during conflict and post-conflict periods 
“that human rights are most in jeopardy”.14 In 
addition, post-conflict settings are a drain on 
states’ budgets, so NHRIs in such settings can find 
themselves bearing the double burden of reduced 
funding and additional, urgent responsibilities. 
In transitional contexts, it is not uncommon for 
donors to step in to provide funding for NHRI 
activities; donors active in this area include the 
UNDP / oHCHR and some bilateral donors, often 
one or more of the Nordic countries. However, for-
eign funding brings its own challenges with respect 
to independence, autonomy and sustainability.15 
one of the challenges faced by NHRIs in transi-
tional settings lies in the fact that the mandates 
they are given are often limited to addressing 
issues and violations that arose after their estab-
lishment, i. e. they do not have the authority to deal 
with past abuses. For example, legislation empow-
ering an NHRI to investigate complaints sometimes 
includes a time limitation, as is the case in the 
relevant Indian legislation, which stipulates that 
complaints must be lodged within one-year of the 
triggering event in order to be eligible for investi-
gation;16 in contrast, the Iraqi NHRI is mandated 
to investigate all human rights violations in Iraq, 
including those committed before the promulga-
tion of the legislation that established it.17
NHRIs that are established in the wake of a conflict 
or as part of a conflict settlement sometimes 
receive a specific mandate to inquire into past 
abuses. In this case, “consideration should be 
given to creating special bodies to deal with past 
abuses or to ensure that a transitional justice man-
date is legally conferred” on the NHRI in question.18 
looking into past abuses, especially those lying a 
number of years in the past, can pose a particular 
set of additional challenges in situations where 
evidentiary records are poor or even lacking entire-
ly.19 The sensitive political aspects of transitional 
justice, such as issues of amnesty, impunity, and 
the implications for political stability and human 
security, also pose some serious questions for 
NHRIs that become involved in these processes.20 
A number of NHRIs have been established as part 
of peace agreements (for example in El Salvador 
in1992), and the peace agreements of Guatemala, 
Bosnia-Herzegovina, Sierra leone, Northern Ire-
land, South Africa, Rwanda, and Afghanistan also 
included provisions relating to NHRIs.21 Parlevliet 
noted back in 2006 that greater attention was 
being given to strengthening national justice 
systems and creating human rights monitoring 
and enforcement mechanisms in the aftermath 
of conflict or authoritarian rule, and that NHRIs 
had in fact become one of the most common 
mechanisms to figure in peace agreements in this 
regard.22 However, NHRIs created in this way have 
rarely been given “direct or explicit responsibility” 
14 oHCHR (2010), p. 146. 
15 For an example with respect to Uganda see: Wielders / Amutjojo (2012), p. 5, 6, 17; ICC-SCA (2013), p. 52–53 and for the Afghan and 
Danish examples see: ICC-SCA (2013a), p. 18; ICC-SCA (2007), p. 3–4. 
16 linos / Pegram (2015), p. 29, note 41. 
17 law 53/2008 on the Iraqi High Commission on Human Rights, Art. 5 (1) at http://ihchr.iq/upload/upfile/en/7.pdf (in Arabic) (accessed 
18.11.2016). 
18 oHCHR (2010), p. 34. 
19 UNDP / oHCHR (2010), p. 47. 
20 UNDP / oHCHR (2010), p. 47. 
21 Parlevliet (2006), p. 8. 
22 Parlevliet (2006), p. 1. 
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for monitoring the human rights provisions con-
tained in such peace agreements.23 
NHRIs are permanent institutions in their coun-
tries. If supported by adequate resources, they 
are a strong voice to follow up on the recom-
mendations of mechanisms granting reparations 
or the implementation of long-term reforms – 
something that is often neglected once the focus 
of the international community and the funding 
associated with that has shifted from a violent 
conflict or post-conflict reconstruction to some 
other area. 
2.1 Promotion of 
human rights 
NHRIs have a mandate to promote human 
rights. The Sub-Committee on Accreditation 
(SCA) defines promotion to include “those 
functions which seek to create a society where 
human rights are more broadly understood and 
respected. Such functions may include education, 
training, advising, public outreach and advoca-
cy.”24 In order to be effective, activities aimed at 
promoting human rights must be strategically 
designed, and encompass both outreach activities 
and an assessment of their impact on attitudes 
and behaviour. otherwise they function as one-off 
measures serving only a small group of peo-
ple. one strategy is to tie promotional activities 
closely to the protection function of an NHRI, for 
example, by targeting specific professional groups 
who are in a position to influence human rights 
protection, like law enforcement officers, doctors, 
nurses and teachers, judges and lawyers. other 
strategies may involve targeting disseminators 
and opinion shapers, for example in the media or 
among civic educators, and/or institutionalising 
human rights education in the respective train-
ing programs, for example for teachers or law 
enforcement. 
In a transitional context, promotion of human 
rights will necessarily include reflection on the 
past since a future “society where human rights 
are more broadly understood and respected” (see 
above) cannot be created without such reflec-
tion and the gradual change of attitudes and 
behaviour, which has, in many cases, been shaped 
by decades or years of violence, brutality, and 
impunity. However, since the past is always con-
tested territory in post-conflict societies, promo-
tional activities are a delicate endeavour. 
Box 1: Georgia: Post-conflict and 
 transitional justice context
Georgia must cope with overlapping legacies 
of abuse stemming from a repressive Soviet 
past, a turbulent democratic transition, and 
violent conflicts with Abkhazia, ossetia (both in 
the 1990s), and Russia (2008). These conflicts 
had an enormous impact on civilians, involving 
thousands of killings and injuries, displacement 
and the destruction of property and infra-
structure. After the ‘Rose Revolution’ in 2003, 
some attempts were made at political and 
economic reform, but the new Government’s 
predisposition towards maintaining a strong 
state is thought to have undermined the effort 
to complete democratisation.25 Parliamentary 
elections – hailed as marking the beginning of 
the second transitional process since indepen-
dence – were held in october 2012.26 In January 
2016, the International Criminal Court decided 
to open an investigation into the situation in 
Georgia in view of the evidence of international 
crimes committed during the conflict periods.27 
Transitional justice approaches have not been 
pursued in a strategic or systematic way, but 
rather in a fragmented and frequently spo-
radic fashion.28 Within the wider scope of 
peace-building efforts, the search for justice 
23 Parlevliet (2006), p. 10.
24 ICC-SCA (2013), p. 9. See also oHCHR (2010), p. 55 ff.
25 Frichova (2009), p. 4, 8. 
26 Hammarberg (2013), p. 5. 
27 International Criminal Court, Situation in Georgia, ICC-01/15, https://www.icc-cpi.int/georgia?ln=en (accessed 02.10.2016). 
28 Frichova (2009), p. 25 for a critical assessment. 
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has frequently taken a back seat to ‘protracted 
negotiation processes’ on multiple fronts: While 
civil society groups and opposition politicians 
have repeatedly called for a thorough airing of 
contentious aspects of the past, others argue 
that their demands are selective in nature.29 
Human Rights Watch has described Georgia’s 
human rights record in 2015 as uneven, stating 
that the numerous investigations into alleged 
crimes by former officials have raised questions 
of selective justice and the political motivation 
of prosecutions.30 Concerns about the levels of 
impunity in Georgia remain at the UN Human 
Rights Committee.31
The Public Defender of Georgia engages in a wide 
range of activities intended to promote human 
rights, such as hosting public debates, provid-
ing capacity-building training and promoting 
trust-building dialogue in the context of transi-
tional justice. It also works to promote recon-
ciliation. Many of the issues explored in these 
activities relate to the effects of conflict and 
violence, displacement, the justice system, and 
ethnic minorities in Georgia. Examples of public 
debates hosted by the PDo are the Constitutional 
Court, violence against children, challenges to 
tolerance, and human rights in the conflict-af-
fected regions. In addition, the PDo engages with 
the public through a number of competitions, with 
themes like ethnic groups and religions, toler-
ance and diversity, women’s rights, and Georgian 
conflicts and policies aimed at resolving them. 
These initiatives target the media, journalists, 
and other sectors of society. A lot of this public 
engagement includes aspects of truth-seeking, 
participation, dialogue, empowerment, address-
ing  marginalisation and giving a voice and a 
platform to those affected by past and present 
abuses to raise their concerns.32 The PDo’s public 
engagement opens up a space in society in which 
to  consider what mechanisms of transitional 
justice are most appropriate in the particular 
circumstances.
Box 2: Georgia: The National Human Rights 
Institution
The Georgian NHRI – the Public Defender and 
the Public Defender’s office (PDo) - is defined 
under the 1996 organic law on the Public 
Defender of Georgia and anchored in the con-
stitution.33 The PDo was last re-accredited with 
A-status in 2013. It oversees the observance 
of human rights and freedoms in Georgia, and 
advises the Government on necessary steps 
to be taken to fully protect and respect human 
rights, including with respect to national laws, 
policies and practice. 
The PDo is entitled to receive complaints and 
investigate them; it can also lodge complaints 
with the Constitutional Court of Georgia and 
submit third party interventions to the courts. 
The PDo can also undertake awareness raising 
and educational activities in relation to human 
rights.
The PDo has performed the functions of the 
National Preventive Mechanism of the optional 
Protocol to the United Nations Convention 
against Torture and other Cruel, Inhuman or 
Degrading Treatment or Punishment (oP-CAT) 
since 2009. Since 2014, the PDo has also 
been designated as an Equality Body, and as 
a Monitoring Body for implementation of the 
UN Convention on the Rights of Persons with 
Disabilities. 
29 Frichova (2009), p. 22.
30 Human Rights Watch (2016). 
31 UN, Human Rights Committee (2014), para 11 ff.
32 See Public Defender of Georgia (2017), p. 31 ff.
33 The Constitution emphasises that any obstruction of the Defender’s work is a punishable offence; the Public Defender’s work cannot be 
suspended or restricted during a state of emergency or a state of war. In 2015, the PDo had 143 persons on staff, about 75% of whom 
were on fixed contracts. The PDo operated on a budget of 4.7 million euro, see Public Defender of Georgia (2016), p. 5–6. 
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Box 3: Uganda: Post-conflict and transitional justice context
Uganda suffered almost two decades of civil strife, from 1962 to 1985. When the current president, 
yoweri Museveni gained control of the country in 1986, his movement fought, defeated, and made 
deals with many resistance movements. A (chronically underfunded) Commission of Inquiry docu-
mented human rights violations that occurred between1962 and 1986, including many committed by 
police and other law enforcement bodies.34 
The most protracted struggle, the conflict with the lord’s Resistance Army (lRA), which is confined 
to the northern areas of the country35, remains unresolved. Both the insurgent and counterinsurgency 
tactics have caused widespread suffering among civilians, including that associated with the exten-
sive recruitment of child soldiers. They have also resulted in the internal displacement of millions 
of northern Ugandans.36 Uganda’s conflict and post-conflict narrative and the transitional justice 
discourse and efforts associated with it have focused primarily on the conflict with the lRA in the 
decades since 1986.37 The Juba Talks, held between 2006 and 2008, led to a number of important 
protocols, but ultimately failed to achieve a peace agreement.
A range of stand-alone transitional justice initiatives (for example commissions of inquiry, an amnesty 
law, international investigations, and national policies, on IDPs, for example) were implemented 
after 1986. A coherent strategy or overarching framework for transitional justice has been lacking, 
however, and this, coupled with a lack of commitment from the Government, has resulted in clashes 
between different transitional justice mechanisms, impairing their capacity to operate effectively.38 
A total of 26,000 persons, half of them from the lRA, benefitted from an Amnesty Act enacted in 
2000.39 National efforts to render retributive justice include the establishment of an International 
Crimes Division at the High Court of Uganda.40 
In May 2013, the Ugandan Government released a draft transitional justice policy. Based on a num-
ber of studies and consultations dating from as far back as 2008, the policy envisioned truth-telling 
processes, reparations, re-integration and reconciliation and traditional justice mechanisms. The 
draft policy gave an assessment of the current practice, which focussed on retributive justice. Critics 
pointed out a lack of victim-centeredness and of attention to community issues (for example land jus-
tice, communal and family conflicts) and the difficult line between reintegration and reconciliation, as 
seen in the divides between persons abducted during the conflict and their communities.41 As of this 
writing, the transitional justice policy has not been adopted, but parts of it are being implemented. 
34 on the Commission and its monumental report: http://www.hpcrresearch.org/mrf-database/mission.php?id=114 (accessed 
01.10.2016).
35 See the Refugee law Project (2004). on the cases investigated by the International Criminal Court against lRA leaders, see https://www.
icc-cpi.int/uganda?ln=en (accessed 01.10.2016). 
36 UHRC / oHCHR (2011).
37 Avocats Sans Frontières (2013), p. 30. 
38 Avocats Sans Frontières (2013), p. 36. 
39 Figures quoted by ICTJ, Is Uganda’s Judicial System Ready to Prosecute Serious Crimes? https://www.ictj.org/news/uganda-kwoye-
lo-case (accessed 01.10.2016). 
40 Very few cases have been adjudicated by the division; see http://www.ulii.org/ug/judgment/high-court-international-crimes-division 
(accessed 01.10.2016). For more detail on one of the cases involving an lRA rebel leader and the question of whether he was entitled to 
amnesty under the Amnesty Act, see ICTJ (2015) and the Court’s Statement on the progress of the Thomas Kwoyelo trial at https://www.
jlos.go.ug:442/index.php/news-media-events/newsroom/latest-news/item/558-icd-statement-on-the-progress-of-the-thomas-kwoyelo-
trial (accessed 01.10.2016). 
41 Transitional Justice Working Group (2013), p. 17–18. 
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Box 4: Uganda: The National Human Rights 
Institution
The Uganda Human Rights Commission 
(UHRC) was established and mandated under 
the provisions of articles 51–58 of the 1995 
Constitution of Uganda.42 Its establishment can 
be traced back to one of the recommendations 
issued by the earlier Commission of Inquiry 
into violations of human rights.43 The range of 
the UHRC’s functions is extremely broad and 
includes the right to investigate, at its own 
initiative or based on a complaint, the violation 
of any human right; to visit jails, prisons, and 
places of detention or related facilities; to mon-
itor the state’s compliance with its international 
obligations; and to educate the public. Quite 
unlike other NHRIs, the UHRC is vested with 
court-like powers. The UHRC was re-accredited 
with A-status in 2013. The Commission has ten 
regional offices, and a further ten field offices. 
In Article 5.5 of the Juba Agreement on 
Accountability and Reconciliation (2007), the 
Parties stated that they consider the UHRC to 
be capable of implementing relevant aspects 
of the Agreement, but did not specify which 
aspects.
The UHRC was represented on the committee that 
drafted the transitional justice policy (see above, 
Box 3) and is one of the key actors in its imple-
mentation, in particular through suo moto inves-
tigations, investigating complaints made by any 
person or group of persons against the violation of 
any human right, and capacity-building in human 
rights investigations, documentation, and report-
ing.44 Since 2016, the UHRC has been the lead 
implementer of the Human Rights Documentation 
Programme, which was established to document 
violations and provide consolidated, accessible, 
reliable, and accurate information on the nature 
and scale of conflict-related human rights and 
humanitarian law violations. The intent is that 
its results will be used to inform interventions to 
ensure justice for the victims.45 
The UHRC had also taken part in an UN-funded 
peace-building project with former internally 
displaced people (IDPs) in the Acholi region of 
Northern Uganda. The project was intended to 
complement the State-led resettlement exercise 
following the end of the 20-year war.46 The UHRC 
developed and delivered training to members of 
the Uganda Police Force, community paralegals, 
local officials, court officials, district administra-
tion personnel, and land committees. The project 
carried out sensitisation campaigns aimed at 
creating awareness of legal rights in communities, 
with a focus on land rights, land laws, children’s 
rights and issues of domestic violence and com-
munity empowerment. The UHRC also engaged in 
coordinating the activities of Civil-Military Cooper-
ation Centres in some areas of Northern Uganda. 
These centres were involved in joint monitoring, 
investigations, training, human rights sensitisa-
tion, mediation, and public outreach activities, and 
contributed to capacity building for key institu-
tions and individuals in the security sector such 
as the army, police, government focal points, and 
local government officials.47 During the period of 
negotiations between the Ugandan Government 
and the lRA, the UHRC also assisted by providing 
guidance to the parties on mediation and human 
rights.48 Another UHRC project on access to 
justice focussed on marginalised communities in 
42 As to the budget available to UHRC, in the 2013/14 financial year UHRC was allocated the equivalent of 3.43 million euro, 35% of which 
came from development partners. As of December 2014, UHRC had 232 staff, including substantive, volunteer, project staff, chairperson, 
and members of the Commission: UHRC (2014), p. 85. 
43 See note 34, recommendation 13.1 (ii). 
44 Transitional Justice Working Group (2013), p. 29; see also NANHRI (2014), p. 12 ff. 
45 Daily Monitor (04.10.2016). 
46 The resettlement of the IDPs was carried out through the government’s Peace, Recovery and Development Plan (PRDP) initiated in 2007. 
CIPESA, a donor-funded centre on ICT policies in Southern and Eastern Africa, undertook a sobering assessment of the plan’s imple-
mentation in 2014: http://cipesa.org/2014/11/documenting-the-impact-of-aid-cuts-on-the-peace-recovery-and-delivery-programme/ 
(accessed 26.09.2016). on the overall engagement of the UHRC, see NANHRI (2014), p. 12 ff. 
47 UHRC (2010), p. 4. 
48 The Commonwealth (2013), p. 11. 
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the Acholi region, and mediating in land-related 
conflicts amongst returnees in conflict-affected 
areas.49 The UHRC pointed out that the tangible 
needs of post-conflict populations need to be 
addressed along with their rights: NHRIs should 
advocate for and facilitate the implementation of 
transitional justice programs, in particular “mea-
sures for reparations and realization of related 
socio-economic rights, such as access to phys-
ical and mental health services, education, and 
economic and infrastructure support.”50 These 
concerns were reflected in the 2012 report “Pick-
ing up the Pieces” on the Acholi region, which was 
based on earlier monitoring work by the UHRC 
(see section 2.2.1, below). 
The challenges involved in fulfilling “needs and 
rights” raised by the UHRC are echoed in a 2015 
report by the International Center for Transitional 
Justice on the unredressed needs of children 
born of sexual violence and their mothers. While 
a development approach might meet some of the 
immediate needs of these women and their chil-
dren in terms of access to social and economic 
resources, development support in and of itself 
does not constitute reparations.51 Development 
efforts thus need to be designed to contribute to 
the realisation of economic, social and cultural 
rights, and the UHRC is one of the NHRIs that 
have adopted guidelines on the human rights-
based approach to development.52 Thus the 
UHRC has been active in monitoring (see section 
2.2.1), mediation, training, awareness-raising 
and reporting in relation to processes of tran-
sitional justice. It has also provided advice to 
the Government on law and policies and worked 
with other national and international actors to 
develop the Human Rights National Action Plan 
(NAP) for Uganda, initially in fulfilment of commit-
ments arising from the Universal Periodic Review 
in 2011.53 
Box 5: Afghanistan: Post-conflict and 
 transitional justice context
During the period between 1978 and the fall of 
the Taliban regime in 2001, Afghanistan expe-
rienced a communist coup, a Soviet invasion, a 
mujahedeen insurgency, and repressive Taliban 
rule. Widespread and systemic violations of 
human rights occurred in all these different 
political settings, and the population experi-
enced and witnessed disappearances, torture, 
mass executions, ethnic persecution, internal 
displacement, gender-based discrimination and 
mass emigration of Afghans to Pakistan and 
Iran. 
The question of how to address the legacy of 
the different periods of conflict, insecurity and 
repression is contentious and complex, and 
has been debated for over a decade. Further 
complicating the situation is an environment 
of on-going conflict, insecurity and weak state 
institutions, and the presence of many alleged 
perpetrators in positions of power. Impunity has 
been allowed to prevail because the focus has 
been largely on ending conflict and insecurity 
by negotiating with insurgent leaders and their 
fighters and reintegrating them into society. In 
the attempts to secure peace and stability, the 
predominant approach followed by policymak-
ers has “largely failed to include justice as a 
component of reconciliation and reintegration 
processes”.54 
49 The Commonwealth (2013), p. 13. 
50 The Commonwealth (2013), p. 13.
51 ICTJ (2015a), p. 31. 
52 UHRC (2008), p. 32. 
53 Meanwhile, the status of the National Action Plan on Human Rights is unclear. While in its UPR report (2016) the Government claimed 
that it had issued a plan based on broad stakeholder consultation in 2014, the UHRC annual report speaks of a draft National Action Plan: 
UHRC (2016), p. 236. 
54 Winterbotham (2012), p. 1.
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Box 6: Afghanistan: The National Human 
Rights Institution
The Afghanistan Independent Human Rights 
Commission (AIHRC) has been inextricably 
bound up with the history of transitional justice 
since the 2001 Bonn Agreement provided for 
its establishment.55 The Commission began 
its activities in 2002 on the basis of a presi-
dential decree. This decree tasked the AIHRC 
with developing a national action plan for 
human rights, monitoring rights throughout 
the country, investigating alleged violations, 
carrying out a national programme of human 
rights education and organising human rights 
consultations.56 The latter included a national 
consultation on transitional justice, which led to 
a proposal for a national strategy for addressing 
past abuses. 
Article 58 of the 2004 constitution enshrined 
the AIHRC as Afghanistan’s NHRI, and the law 
on the Structure, Duties and Mandate of the 
AIHRC was adopted in 2005.57 Article 4 of that 
legislation lays down “equal and fair access to 
social welfare and other services provided by 
the State” as a human right, and article 21(4) 
lays a duty on the Commission to monitor the 
performance of governmental authorities and 
NGos concerning the “fair and accessible dis-
tribution of services and welfare”. The AIHRC is 
also charged with seeking effective approaches 
for harmonising international human rights prin-
ciples and processes with Afghan culture and 
traditions, and planning and implementing “pro-
grams that include the investigation of crimes 
and human rights abuses as part of the transi-
tional process” (Article 21(12)). The AIHRC was 
last re-accredited with A-status in 2014.58 
The AIHRC launched an extensive national pro-
gramme of consultations on transitional justice 
in 2004. The consultations captured data from 
over 4,151 respondents, convened over 200 focus 
groups, and involved all of Afghanistan’s prov-
inces at the time, as well as refugee populations 
in Iran and Pakistan. People in the focus groups 
were very willing to discuss the issues involved, 
and evinced a strong sense of gratitude for having 
being consulted at all. The process constituted 
the first effort ever made to consult with the 
general public about their experiences of violence 
and suffering, and their views on the best way 
forward for Afghanistan. Great symbolic meaning 
has therefore been attached to it: it stands for 
people’s participation in society and the state’s 
willingness to engage with and listen to them. The 
2005 report that resulted from the consultations, 
“A Call for Justice”, notes that the state and the 
international community should build on this work 
in order to “enable the vast majority of Afghans to 
regain their trust in public institutions”, that there 
are hopes that the work can contribute towards 
overcoming the enormous challenges of security 
and justice facing the country, and that it will help 
to heal the nation’s pain, bring about the rule of 
law and end the culture of impunity in Afghani-
stan.59 The report outlines the legacy of human 
rights violations and abuses, explores both judicial 
and non-judicial mechanisms for transitional jus-
tice, and presents potential measures for reform 
and reconciliation in Afghanistan. Follow-up 
discussions on the report led to the development 
and adoption of a national Action Plan on Peace, 
Justice and Reconciliation. The Plan identified five 
key actions: 
– acknowledgement of the suffering of the 
Afghan people;
55 Agreement on Provisional Arrangements in Afghanistan Pending the Re-Establishment of Permanent Government Institutions (Bonn Agree-
ment), http://www.un.org/news/dh/latest/afghan/afghan-agree.htm (accessed 01.10.2016).
56 Decree of the Presidency of the Interim Administration of Afghanistan on the Establishment of an Afghan Independent Human Rights 
Commission, 6 June 2002, http://www.aihrc.org.af/ media/files/laws/decree.pdf (accessed 01.10.2016).
57 law on the Structure, Duties and Mandate of the AIHRC 2005, Decree No.16, 22/02/1384, Article 4, http://www.aihrc.org.af/media/
files/laws/law_AIHRC.pdf (accessed 01.10.2016). 
58 In 2015, the AIHRC had 603 staff and a budget of an equivalent of 11.93 million euro, see AIHRC (2015), p. 71. ANNI / CSHRN (2014), 
p. 6 criticise the lack of budgetary support for the AIHRC, which is almost completely financed by donors. 
59 AIHRC (2005), p. 5–6. 
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– ensuring credible and accountable state insti-
tutions (vetting);
– truth-seeking and documentation;
– promotion of reconciliation and national unity 
and 
– establishment of effective and reasonable 
accountability mechanisms.
The Afghan Government presented the action 
plan at the International Conference on Afghani-
stan in london in early 2006, where Afghanistan 
and the international community agreed that it 
would be implemented over a three-year term. In 
the following years, the Government neither fully 
implemented nor rescinded the plan60 – probably 
one of the worst outcomes of transitional justice 
processes, but not an infrequent one. 
Among the few steps that were implemented 
was the establishment by the Government of an 
advisory board to vet senior government appoint-
ments. The board was mandated to find, interview 
and vet appropriate and honest candidates for 
senior and other government posts, including in 
the civil service and police force. Due to interfer-
ence by the president, however, the board has not 
been very successful in carrying out its respon-
sibilities, and the new Government has generally 
bypassed the advisory board. 
As a way to acknowledge the suffering of Afghans, 
the Government made December 10 National 
Remembrance Day, honouring the victims of 
human rights violations. It also erected a mon-
ument at the site of a mass grave in Faizabad, 
Badakhshan province. The AIHRC established a 
museum close to the monument, to honour the 
victims buried in the mass grave and to provide 
a place for the survivors and surviving relatives 
to gather to remember and reflect on the past.61 
For the same purpose and with support from the 
Netherlands, the AIHRC also built a monument 
in the Jaghori district of Ghazni province. Civil 
society organisations, among them the Afghani-
stan Human Rights and Democracy organization 
and Afghan Victims’ Families Association, organ-
ised a transitional justice coordination committee, 
and hold events on December 10 each year to 
mark National Remembrance Day for victims of 
war crimes. In 2009, a Transitional Justice Coor-
dination Group (TJCG) was established with the 
support and involvement of AIHRC, UNAMA, ICTJ 
and the open Society Institute. In 2010, the TJCG 
organised a “Victims’ Jirga”, a national gathering 
of civilian victims of war from regions all over 
Afghanistan to remember the victims of past 
crimes. Jirga participants demanded trials for war 
criminals, and the event was repeated the follow-
ing year to ensure that the voices and demands of 
the victims could not be forgotten in the midst of 
the other political processes underway. 
Human rights promotion is a key function of 
NHRIs; it is also a duty of the states that have 
ratified human rights treaties. While NHRIs have 
a mandate to promote human rights, their obliga-
tion is independent of that of their states. In other 
words: establishing and funding an NHRI alone 
does not constitute the fulfilment of a state’s obli-
gation to promote human rights. This also holds 
true for the promotion of human rights in transi-
tional contexts. In practice, however, many NHRIs 
find themselves in situations in which a state is 
reluctant, unwilling, or unable, to fulfil its obliga-
tion to implement activities to promote human 
rights. Under these circumstances, NHRIs have to 
find ways to embark upon such activities without 
letting their states ‘off the hook’. Many NHRIs, in 
most cases with support from the international 
community, have taken innovative approaches to 
fulfil their responsibility to promote human rights, 
such as those depicted above. However, exter-
nal financing always brings with it challenges for 
sustainability and resources. To develop a sustain-
able model of intervention for longer-term peace 
building initiatives, NHRIs should devise strategies 
at an early stage intended to ensure that human-
rights promoting activities can be sustained by 
other institutions. 
60 Gossman (2013), p. 6. 
61 Winterbotham (2012), p. 24; Afghanistan Justice organization and GPPAC Global Secretariat (2013), p. 7. 
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2.2 Protection of human 
rights 
Protection of human rights is the other key part 
of the mandate of all NHRIs, regardless of the 
situation their country is in. The SCA defines 
protection functions as “those that address and 
seek to prevent actual human rights violations. 
Such functions include monitoring, inquiring, 
investigating and reporting on human rights 
violations, and may include individual complaint 
handling.”62
2.2.1 Monitoring and reporting
Monitoring is a key function of NHRIs, and is ful-
filled in different modes. Most NHRIs issue regular 
reports on the human rights situation in their 
countries, basing these on secondary sources as 
well as their own research and data gathering. A 
common source of data is the systematic analysis 
of complaints received by an NHRI or from the 
inspection visits it conducted over the reporting 
period. Few, if any NHRIs have the capacity to 
monitor all of the human rights standards the 
country has committed itself to respect, protect 
and fulfil, and concentrate instead on the human 
rights issues felt to be of greatest significance 
in their countries. Many NHRIs therefore choose 
to monitor the situation with respect to specific 
human rights issues, for example abuses in 
prisons or violations of the rights of persons with 
disabilities. The monitoring function of NHRIs is 
intimately connected to other powers that are 
encompassed in their mandates, for example the 
power to receive complaints, to recommend that 
the state prosecutor take action upon them, to 
conduct investigations or inquiries on their own 
accord and to demand access to all necessary 
information. Ultimately, the strength of an NHRI’s 
monitoring is also related to its capacity to anal-
yse and present its results to a larger public and 
to follow-up on its findings and push for imple-
mentation of its recommendations. 
In transitional contexts, both regular and ad hoc 
monitoring can serve as a means to uncover and 
address violations of human rights. Monitoring can 
also have a preventative effect. Ensuring wide geo-
graphical coverage can help to rebuild the trust 
of those living in regions that have been margin-
alised. Monitoring can also be helpful in tracking 
the status and fulfilment of human rights during 
a transitional period and detecting any emerging 
patterns of abuse. In many transitional contexts, 
NHRIs have found it prudent to join forces with 
civil society organisations for monitoring pur-
poses. While pragmatism may often be a moti-
vating factor in this decision – pooling strengths 
in a resource-poor and possibly dangerous envi-
ronment – it often improves the quality of mon-
itoring reports and widens the pool of qualified 
human rights monitors. It also has the potential to 
increase the degree of impartiality in monitoring, 
depending on the organisations involved. 
The PDo in Georgia carries out regular and ad hoc 
visits to a variety of establishments and institu-
tions. Its rights to monitor are broader than those 
of most other European NHRIs. In 2014 and 2015, 
PDo units conducted visits to penitentiary estab-
lishments, temporary detention locations, police 
divisions, children’s homes, and mental health 
centres; one unit monitored a migrant return oper-
ation. The PDo visited a total of 3,040 prisoners 
in 2014 and 3,300 in 2015.63 Georgia was com-
mended by the Special Rapporteur on Torture in 
2015 for its efforts to combat torture and ill-treat-
ment, who testified to the “drastic changes” since 
october 2012, although he also noted that much 
remained to be done.64 A 2014 report on human 
rights abuses in Georgia’s prisons compiled by 
the open Society Georgia Foundation spoke of 
positive assessments of the permission granted 
to NGo representatives to enter detention cells 
under the auspices of the PDo. According to the 
NGos consulted for the report, allegations of tor-
ture in pre-trial detention facilities had decreased 
due to their visits. 65 
62 ICC-SCA (2013), p. 9. 
63 See Public Defender of Georgia (2016a), p. 7; Public Defender of Georgia (2015), p. 5.
64 UN, Human Rights Council (2015), para 26–29. 
65 open Society Georgia Foundation (2014), p. 11. 
HoW NHRIS ENGAGE 21
Another division at the PDo, the Tolerance Cen-
tre, monitors the rights of religious and ethnic 
minorities and disseminates its findings through a 
website available in three languages.66 The centre 
issues public statements on instances of intol-
erance directed against Muslims and of violence 
against women; and in 2014 it organised a high-
level meeting attended by the oSCE High Commis-
sioner on National Minorities and the President. 
The establishment and practices of the Centre, a 
specialised unit within the PDo that develops rela-
tionships with NGos and civil society, has been 
commended as a useful model.67 The Centre has 
also monitored the implementation of the Action 
Plan and National Concept for Tolerance and Civil 
Integration.68 
With respect to the portion of the population 
affected by conflict and persons internally dis-
placed (IDPs) during the different phases of 
conflict in Georgia,69 the PDo carries out field 
and monitoring visits to affected regions and IDP 
settlements to investigate their human rights 
situation and provide free legal advice. In addition, 
the PDo has established an advisory council, the 
ossetian Forum, which advises on the rights of 
the conflict-affected ethnically ossetian portion 
of the population. A legal expert was assigned to 
research human rights issues arising in connec-
tion with persons affected by conflict.
In order to keep itself well informed about the 
human rights situation, redress human rights 
violations and advocate for improved human 
rights protection for conflict-affected populations, 
the PDo actively cooperates with NGos and 
community organisations active in the sphere of 
conflict resolution and transformation, such as 
the IDP network Synergia. Nonetheless, the PDo 
declared in 2014 that the conflict-affected areas 
of Abkhazia and South ossetia remained “a black 
hole in terms of human rights monitoring and 
protection.”70 The PDo called for an international 
monitoring mission to address violations such as 
property expropriation, ethnic discrimination, and 
abductions.71 The Special Rapporteur on Torture, 
visiting Georgia in 2015, was denied access to the 
pertinent areas.72
In Uganda, the UHRC monitored and documented 
violations of human rights during the period of 
hostilities and later also hosted consultative 
workshops to highlight the needs of war-affected 
communities (see above, section 2.1). The disag-
gregated data that the UHRC generated enabled 
them to highlight the needs of particular groups 
and individuals, such as women, children, and 
other vulnerable groups. Further monitoring and 
documentation focused on the needs of IDPs, 
and this led the UHRC to begin advocating the 
development of a national IDP policy. The UHRC 
further advocated the application of human rights 
principles to the return, reintegration, and rehabil-
itation of IDPs in safety and dignity, including the 
restoration of property and the establishment of 
adequate social services.73 
Another notable form of engagement by the UHRC 
was its research in the Greater North of Uganda 
between 2007 and 2011 in cooperation with the 
UN office of the High Commission for Human 
Rights (oHCHR). The research resulted in a report 
on victims’ perspectives on the right to remedy 
and reparation. It has been described as one of 
the most “ambitious documentation projects 
ever undertaken in the country” and the task was 
66 See Public Defender of Georgia (2014), p. 16. 
67 Carver (2011), p. 17. 
68 See Public Defender of Georgia at http://www.ombudsman.ge/en/news/1718-the-tolerance-center-presents-the-results-of-the-monitor-
ing-of-the-action-plan-and-national-concept-for-tolerance-and-civil-integration.page (accessed 26.09.2016). 
69 Approximately 220,000 people were forced from their homes during the conflicts in the early 1990s. A second phase of displacement 
occurred during the conflict in August 2008, and resulted in the displacement of about 128,000 people from South ossetia and adjacent 
areas, and from parts of Abkhazia. The majority of those displaced in 2008 managed to return, but almost 26,000 remained displaced: 
Amnesty International (2010), p. 7. 
70 Public Defender of Georgia (2014a), p. 1.
71 Public Defender of Georgia (2014a), p. 2. 
72 UN, Human Rights Council (2015), para 4. 
73 The Commonwealth (2013), p. 12. 
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heralded as a “daunting one”,74 but nevertheless 
as constituting a key contribution to realising 
victims’ right to truth. 
Box 7: The right to an effective remedy
The scope of the right to an effective remedy 
incorporates various elements of restitution 
(particularly relevant with respect to land), 
compensation, rehabilitation (health care and 
legal services), satisfaction (public disclosure 
and apology) and guarantees of non-recurrence. 
Guarantees of non-recurrence are defined as 
requiring the civilian control of armed forces, 
international standards of due process, legal 
reform, an independent judiciary, robust pro-
tection regimes, training in human rights and 
humanitarian law and a gender-just interpre-
tation of laws through promotion of women’s 
rights and equality.75
like the PDo in Georgia, the Afghan Human 
Rights Commission (AIHRC) gave input to a 2005 
National Action Plan on Peace, Justice and Rec-
onciliation, including through a comprehensive 
documentation project. The Conflict Mapping 
Project catalogued all conflict-related human 
rights violations in the country from 1978 to 2001 
in each of Afghanistan’s provinces. This ambitious 
effort details abuses committed by all parties 
to the conflict, through every phase of the war. 
This was particularly important given that most 
Afghans had suffered tremendous losses during 
the different phases of the conflict but were not 
aware that others, in different parts of the country 
and in a different war, had also suffered.76 The 
Conflict Mapping Project was likened to a “truth 
commission in content and scope”.77 However, as 
of this writing, the 800 page report has yet to be 
published – the AIHRC decided to postpone its 
release due to the deteriorating security situation 
as well as threats made against its staff. But the 
report is an important document on the history of 
Afghanistan; all the more since there are political 
forces who would like to completely deny that any 
violations of human rights occurred over the past 
four decades.
Box 8: Refugees and internally displaced 
persons
Most conflicts result in the displacement of sig-
nificant numbers of refugees to third countries 
and the scattering of IDPs. In 2015, 65 million 
displaced persons came under the mandate of 
the UN High Commissioner for Refugees. As 
national bodies with regional and international 
networks, NHRIs are well placed to address the 
rights of refugee and IDP populations, who are 
all too frequently “forgotten” when a conflict 
has passed beyond the immediate humanitarian 
emergency stage. With the increasing tendency 
to see refugee, migrant and IDP populations 
as a risk to national security, many NHRIs 
see engagement in this area as mandatory.78 
However, a strategic vision for the scope and 
duration of this engagement, particularly with 
respect to IDP populations, is beneficial for any 
NHRI that addresses internal displacement.
Analysts speak of an effective silencing of the 
AIHRC with respect to the documentation effort, 
and the efforts relating to transitional justice 
have stalled.79 A civil society submission for the 
2014 re-accreditation of the AIHRC expressed 
the view that the Government’s failure to provide 
protection for AIHRC, combined with an alleged 
compromise between the administration and 
74 Beyond The Hague (Blog), Paul Bradfield: Uganda Announces Transitional Justice Policy (9 August 2013). https://beyondthehague.
com/2013/08/09/the-lapse-of-amnesty-in-uganda-stimulating-accountability-or-prolonging-conflict (accessed 16.09.2016).
75 See UN, General Assembly (2006). 
76 Gossman (2013), p. 2, 5. 
77 Gossman (2013), p. 5. 
78 See the Belgrade Declaration issued by 32 NHRIs and ombudspersons mainly from Europe in 2015 at http://nhri.ohchr.org/EN/News/
lists/News/DispForm.aspx?ID=207&ContentTypeId=0x0104006A3D2D731523E24B9C932DE5D6E5EDFF (accessed 26.09.2016). 
79 Gossman (2013), p. 6; Tag: AIHRC Afghanistan Independent Human Rights Commission at https://www.afghanistan-analysts.org/tag/
afghanistan-independent-human-rights-commission/ (accessed 16.09.2016). on the 2016–2017 debate on ICC investigations: see Qaane 
(27.06.2017). 
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alleged human rights violators, has prevented the 
publication of the institution’s “most significant 
and meaningful contribution to Afghanistan’s dem-
ocratic transition process.”80
Within the context of the National Action Plan 
on Peace, Justice and Reconciliation, the AIHRC 
also worked hard to realise the envisioned vetting 
mechanism: a Presidential Special Advisory Board 
for Senior Appointments, responsible for vetting 
candidates for government and other authorities 
on the basis of their human rights record and 
any past crimes. The AIHRC has worked with the 
Afghan Civil Service Commission to review the 
human rights records of persons under consid-
eration for appointments, and encouraged the 
creation of an Advisory Panel for Appointments, 
which formulates rules and advises the President 
on senior political appointments.81 However, the 
passing of an amnesty law undermined the vetting 
mechanism.82
As the NHRI engagement in the three countries 
demonstrates, the monitoring and documentation 
of past and/or ongoing human rights violations is 
crucial for obtaining justice and redress. However, 
it is also a highly sensitive endeavour, one which 
can endanger NHRI staff, as is the case in Afghan-
istan, and which can be subject to both political 
interference and obstruction, especially when it 
implicates individuals who are still in power. 
2.2.2 Complaints handling
The competence to receive and work on individual 
complaints is optional under the Paris Principles, 
but almost all A-accredited NHRIs exercise this 
function, and many see it as the core of their man-
date. It also appears to be one of the key avenues 
through which NHRIs can address the ongoing 
consequences of past abuses, and the continuing 
nature of such abuses. It is crucial to institute 
effective mechanisms for redress of structural 
and symptomatic violations relating to a conflict 
because complaints in a post-conflict context usu-
ally “reflect the pattern of violations that prevailed 
during the conflict”.83 Whether NHRI complaint 
handling can have a preventive effect depends on 
the follow-up action taken by both the NHRI and 
the state. For complaint handling to be an effective 
avenue for the protection of human rights overall, 
it is therefore advisable for it to be coupled with 
other NHRI functions, i. e. monitoring and promo-
tion of human rights. When this is not the case, 
NHRIs risk the loss of their agenda-setting and the 
more researched-based advisory function.84
The PDo in Georgia received thousands of com-
plaints following the october 2012 elections. The 
complaints concerned a number of issues related 
to the previous administration, including unlaw-
ful deprivation of liberty, ill-treatment in deten-
tion, issues relating to property and pressure to 
‘donate’ property to the state, and relating to other 
unlawful behaviour on the part of state officials, 
such as money laundering.85 In 2013, the PDo 
examined approximately 40 complaints of ill-treat-
ment or degrading treatment of detained persons 
by the police. It asked for preventive measures to 
be put into place in those detention centres where 
ill-treatment appeared to be particularly frequent, 
and for effective and prompt investigation of the 
alleged crimes. In some cases, the prosecution 
failed to find any evidence, while in others the 
investigations dragged on interminably. The PDo 
follows up with these complaints, and has voiced 
concern about the frequent failure to prosecute 
cases and, when cases are prosecuted, about the 
inadequacy of sentencing in relation to the severity 
of the crime, in cases of torture, for example.86 
on the whole, the experience of the PDo in this 
area illustrates the quandary NHRIs find them-
selves in with respect to complaint handling, 
which is particularly delicate in a post-conflict 
80 ANNI / CSHRN (2014), p. 2. 
81 Sajjad (2009), p. 430. 
82 Gossman (2013), p. 6. 
83 Parlevliet (2006), p. 44.
84 linos / Pegram (2015), p. 29–31.
85 Hammarberg (2013), p. 6. 
86 Public Defender of Georgia (2014a), p. 7–8. 
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context: NHRIs do not issue binding decisions,87 
and can thus only bring cases to the attention of 
the executive or the judiciary. If the latter is unwill-
ing or lacks capacity to address individual cases 
and systemic abuses, NHRIs can do no more than 
exercise their soft power – raise their voices, keep 
up their reporting and follow-up and build national 
and international constituencies. 
Perhaps in reaction to the concerns raised by 
the PDo during Georgia’s state reporting proce-
dure in 2014, the UN Human Rights Committee 
encouraged Georgia to establish an independent 
and impartial body to investigate allegations of 
abuse by police and other law enforcement offi-
cers, including torture and inhuman or degrading 
treatment.88 
There is considerable debate over whether it is 
preferable to expand and increase the authority 
and powers of an NHRI to adapt to a transitional 
justice and reform setting, or whether it is more 
effective to set up dedicated distinct bodies with 
appropriate powers and specific expertise, as the 
UN Human Rights Committee has suggested to 
Georgia. There is little evidence suggesting that 
dedicated bodies are not likely to run into the 
same difficulties that NHRIs encounter. In addi-
tion, the more complaint mechanisms are set up, 
the less transparent the situation tends to become 
for those seeking redress, as confusion arises 
about the different roles and functions, for exam-
ple in relation to the roles of a truth commission, 
a domestic tribunal, a domestic fact-finding body, 
a reparations mechanism, and so forth.89 The 
question of “one or many” institutions to address 
the multiple dimensions of past abuses is thus as 
important a subject for debate as that of whether 
“one or many” institutions can best protect human 
rights.90 Both questions are best examined and 
answered in the specific country context – there is 
no blueprint that can be adopted. 
As was the case with the PDo in Georgia, a large 
number of the complaints submitted to the UHRC 
were related to the deprivation of personal liberty 
and to torture, cruel, inhuman or degrading treat-
ment. Most complaints were directed against the 
Uganda Police Force. Apart from investigating the 
complaints, UHRC also recommended that train-
ing of the police force be improved, including the 
training on investigation skills, and that the force 
be equipped with the facilities necessary to avoid 
detaining people beyond the legally permissible 
period while processing their cases. The UHRC 
also advised the State to ratify the optional Pro-
tocol to the Convention against Torture (which it 
has failed to do as of this writing)91 and to provide 
for an additional mechanism for the prevention of 
torture and ill treatment.
How does the handling of complaints addressing 
past abuses by NHRIs differ from their handling of 
other types of complaints? When widespread and 
intense violence persists, it can often be impossi-
ble for an NHRI to investigate complaints thor-
oughly. yet investigations are utterly necessary, 
either for documentary purposes, or to allow an 
NHRI or the complainant to take a case to court. 
Even-handed treatment of complaints is key: the 
function must be impartial and accessible to all 
parties to a conflict, notwithstanding the fact that 
the institution is financed by the state, which is 
often a party to the conflict. on the whole, apart 
from the challenge involved in setting up a trans-
parent complaints management system, NHRIs 
face a heightened standard with respect to overall 
visibility, impartiality and legitimacy in the eyes of 
citizens. To address this, many NHRIs have found 
it useful to establish mobile units or regional 
offices, or both, to facilitate access for victims/
survivors in remote areas. last but not least, NHRI 
staff working on complaints need to be aware of 
and sensitive to the overall conflict context, and 
approach their work accordingly. 
87 With the exception of very few NHRIs, among them the UHRC: see linos / Pegram (2015), p. 32. 
88 UN, Human Rights Committee (2014), para 12. 
89 See, for example, the report on his country mission to Tunisia, in which he recommends the establishment of a coordinating body for all 
transitional justice mechanisms: UN, Human Rights Council (2013), para 88. 
90 See Carver (2011), p. 16.
91 See the 2016 National report of Uganda to the UPR, available at https://www.upr-info.org/en/review/Uganda/Session-26---Novem-
ber-2016/National-report#top, para 17 (accessed 07.03.2017).
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3 Conclusions
The organisational structure and the different 
functions of the NHRIs presented above dictate to 
a certain extent what an NHRI will focus on in its 
engagement with transitional justice processes. 
The office of the Public Defender in Georgia, for 
example, has a wide range of departments, which 
allows the PDo to work on variety of different 
areas in parallel. Not all NHRIs are able to pursue 
such a broad array of activities simultaneously, 
many do not have a comparable depth of capac-
ity and expertise available, nor the extensive 
powers, public profile, and influence that the 
office of the Public Defender in Georgia enjoys. 
one observer remarked that the “enormous pub-
lic prestige of the Public Defender can be brought 
to bear on a range of issues. The power wielded 
by such an institution may be ‘soft’ but far from 
negligible.”92 
likewise, the structure of the NHRI in Uganda has 
allowed it to carry out valuable work on documen-
tation, mediation, and peace building, and it has 
used its human rights promotion to raise aware-
ness of the issues confronting those affected by 
conflict and ways of approaching current con-
cerns, such as land rights. 
When the Afghan National Institution was estab-
lished, it (like a number of NHRIs in latin America 
and Africa) was given a mandate to develop a 
plan for addressing human rights violations and 
crimes of the past, and it has “largely directed the 
transitional justice process” since its creation.93 
The AIHRC has been praised in particular for “its 
creativity and resolve” in working in extremely 
insecure and complicated circumstances to seek 
accountability for violations of human rights.94 
Indeed a huge amount of creativity, patience, 
strength and resolve is required of NHRIs in order 
to maintain their independence in the face of pres-
sures and expectations from states, civil society, 
the larger public and international organisations. 
NHRIs in post-conflict situations have to navigate 
an extremely sensitive political landscape, and the 
room for them to manoeuvre is narrow. 
Some lessons have emerged from NHRI engage-
ment in transitional contexts: 
1 The independence and performance of a given 
NHRI that existed prior to the eruption of a 
violent conflict must be carefully examined 
before a decision is made to adapt its mandate 
to equip it to tackle post-conflict challenges. 
In cases an NHRI established in a pre-conflict 
period is not perceived as fully independent 
of former regimes, other transitional justice 
mechanisms that are specifically set up to 
deal with a new phase in society may be better 
positioned to gain trust by virtue of being new 
and untainted by any association with previous 
regimes, or even previous periods of a coun-
try’s history. If, on the other hand, the NHRI 
acted independently before and throughout the 
conflict, engaging with transitional justice pro-
cesses could serve to increase its visibility, its 
integrity, and/or attract a larger budget from 
the state or donors. It is important to note, 
though, that any NHRI engaging in transitional 
justice processes should take care to be very 
transparent and accountable in order to guard 
against frustrated expectations. Transitional 
justice processes that prove disappointing or 
are deemed unsuccessful may taint the reputa-
tion of an NHRI associated with them. 
92 Carver (2011), p. 19.
93 Winterbotham (2012), p. 17.
94 Sajjad (2009), p. 424.
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2 Funding and support from various donors, 
including technical assistance, capacity build-
ing and advice, has facilitated the growth and 
expansion of NHRIs. It is essential to consider 
how sustainable such a level of activity and 
coverage will be over the long-term, especially 
if governmental or external funding is reduced, 
as the latter invariably will be over time. If an 
NHRI is forced to scale down or close down 
some of its divisions, it must consider the 
impact this could have on its position in civil 
society, and the legal and political processes it 
supported beforehand. 
3 NHRIs are intended to be permanent fixtures 
in society, whereas the mechanisms of tran-
sitional justice are intended to be temporary. 
If NHRIs do become involved in transitional 
justice processes, they should make sure 
that other institutions, and in particular those 
established or supported by the state, likewise 
fulfil their obligations to protect and promote 
human rights in the post-conflict context. 
4 NHRIs in post-conflict situations should be 
aware that their engagement should not 
detract it from its other core protection and 
promotion functions. A focus on the transi-
tional context often crowds out other human 
rights issues unrelated to the (post)conflict 
situation, for example lGBTI rights, juvenile 
justice, domestic violence and economic and 
social rights. If other areas are neglected, the 
development of the NHRI itself may be jeop-
ardised, as its expertise and attention will be 
skewed in a particular direction. 
5 Peace agreements which create or empower 
NHRIs often fail to adequately secure the insti-
tutional capacity within the NHRIs to realise 
the goals set out; the demands of international 
agreements to meet the various social, polit-
ical, economic and cultural standards often 
do not take specific and inherent capacity 
limitations into account; and demands for 
an accountable government that adequately 
responds to past violations and abuses may fail 
to appreciate the difficult bargaining position 
in which NHRIs find themselves. Prospective 
donors and diplomats need to take this into 
account when they negotiate peace agree-
ments with conflict parties and plan for institu-
tional recovery. 
6 The establishment of an NHRI does not in and 
of itself guarantee the promotion and protec-
tion of human rights; NHRIs must determine 
what they can reasonably achieve given the 
extensive limitations and challenges they face. 
The success of NHRIs cannot be judged on a 
short-term basis; developing and embedding 
a human rights culture after a country has 
experienced dictatorial regimes and/or violent 
conflict may take decades or even generations. 
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Abbreviations
AIHRC    Afghanistan Independent Human 
Rights Commission
ENNHRI    European Network of NHRIs 
GANHRI    Global Alliance of National Human 
Rights Institutions
ICTJ    International Centre for Transitional 
Justice
IDPs    Internally displaced people 
lGBTI   lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, Trans* and 
Inter
lRA    lord’s Resistance Army 
NANHRI    Network of African National Human 
Rights Institutions 
NGo   Non-governmental organisation
NHRI    National Human Rights Institution
oHCHR    UN office of the High Commission for 
Human Rights
PDo    Public Defender of Georgia 
SCA    Subcommittee on Accreditation 
TJCG   Transitional Justice Coordination 
Group
UHRC    Uganda Human Rights Commission
UNAMA    United Nations Assistance Mission in 
Afghanistan
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